Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jacques Derrida, Peter F. Strawson and R Kaplan / E Kaplan

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida]
The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida]
Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley]
The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida]
Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling]
Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan]
'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida]
'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P]
If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning]